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The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets* 
I keep secrets.  Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we 
must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets.  Disclosing our secrets 
threatens our survival. (Lugones, 2003, 11) 
Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to 
secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes 
sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of 
oppression is as much a goal as a description of this writing.  Because survival 
may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should 
expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what 
circumstances we should investigate or reveal them.  This issue seems to 
confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists — postcolonial, 
feminist, or otherwise —  that there is cognitive value in learning from people’s 
experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986, Mills 1998).  Whether 
or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin 
thought from the perspective of “others” and “other ‘others’”, as Sandra 
Harding (1991) puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned 
with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women’s shelters and 
lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing 
knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to 
acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that 
they are kept secret risks undermining the potential of those secrets for 
resisting and opposing oppression.  Thus, the epistemological value of 
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oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists’ advice of 
emancipatory activism. 
The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to 
standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage 
but prohibits sharing understanding.  However, as I will argue, the need to 
preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of, 
standpoint epistemology.  Some understanding that might be gained is not 
barred by political considerations, but political distinctions do indicate when 
and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off.  The cognitive 
significance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme 
political vulnerability that morally require secrecy. 
 
 
Standpoint Knowledge 
Cognitive value arises from a standpoint in two different ways.   The first 
is from accessing suppressed knowledge, understandings that people in power 
or systems of power currently obscure.  Bringing a view from the social 
margins to the attention of epistemic agents beyond the oppressed group 
moves it into spheres where it can be of benefit to, and where it can benefit 
from, engaging with mainstream intellectual resources.  More original (in a 
literal sense) to marginalized perspectives is the second form, underdeveloped 
knowledge, including tacit understanding and practical wisdom. 
Underdeveloped understandings must initially provide benefit to, and be 
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developed by, people who experience a common form of oppression. Only once 
appreciated as shared aspects of life can tacit understandings and practical 
wisdom become transferable knowledge.  At that point, coalition and exchange 
with other communities becomes possible that is both politically directed and 
epistemologically fruitful (at least if not suppressed). 
Both suppressed and underdeveloped knowledge provide special 
cognitive value only insofar as they are based on experiences of people in 
oppressed groups that tend to be difficult to access.  Because of oppression, 
people in some groups do not have access to resources that facilitate 
individuals’ learning, such as books or a decent breakfast.  Moreover, isolated 
individuals won’t develop strong communal perspectives.  Isolation from others 
who share experiences of the same form of oppression makes experiences of 
marginalization seem idiosyncratic, or personal rather than political.  This 
applies directly to women, gay men, and especially lesbians, because 
compound oppressions tend to compound isolation.  Therefore, a communal 
perspective may require consciousness-raising and separatism.  Indirectly, but 
no less powerfully, some forms of oppression isolate people from each other by 
restricting education and literacy, and so limiting the ability to share 
experience and understanding.  Articulating the common nature of experiences 
of oppression not only reveals the breadth of an experienced phenomenon, 
such as sexual harassment or racial violence; it also reveals the contingent 
political situation that obscures those experiences.   
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So, resisting oppression provides political wisdom, and Blacks learn from 
Blacks, women from women, and lesbians from lesbians.  Also, single straight 
women and lesbians learn from each other about the privilege of heterosexual 
monogamy and how it fosters sexism; Latino/as, Native North Americans, and 
Blacks learn from each other about racism, and so on.   
However, even unified perspectives may be suppressed.  Actively seeking 
out marginalized views is necessary for bringing together all potential 
approaches. Africanists may learn from feminists, lesbians may learn from 
Quebecois francophones, and iconic straight White heterosexual Western able-
bodied men may learn from us all.  Only less can be learned from the political 
center, because people in that situation already receive a disproportionate 
amount of attention.   
The development for political reasons of views from the social margins 
has a distinctively epistemological result because it encourages effective 
egalitarian social sharing of information (Harding 1991).  Effective sharing 
requires both counteracting the social pressures that marginalize some 
perspectives, and making sure that experiences of life at the margins develop 
into generalizable perspectives.  Even canonical Western philosophers (e.g. Mill 
1956) recognize cognitive value in the consideration of multiple perspectives.  
Learning from a range of positions (social or ideological) is cognitively valuable 
in order to counteract people’s stubbornness and science’s undemocratic 
tendencies.  
 5 
Working against the underdevelopment and suppression of views from 
the social margins requires special attention to these views.  This involves 
affirmative action in the name of stricter cognitive standards.  Of course, 
benefiting the understanding of people in general by developing perspectives 
from the margins is no straightforward matter.  In addition to the general 
problems of moving “from margin to center,” particular situations of political 
oppression and corresponding cognitive resources require particularized 
accounts.  Nevertheless, in general, knowledge improves when addressed to the 
interests of people on the social margins, and reflects their concerns and 
problems that otherwise tend to be sidelined or remain isolated.  In this way, 
for instance, as Patricia Hill Collins argues, insider-outsiders, who resist a 
particular form of oppression but who have some access to the authority of the 
political center, help create better sociology (1991). i 
 
Oppositional Secrecy 
The very nature of secrecy makes it difficult to find examples — and so 
much the worse because suppression and underdevelopment make 
understanding from an oppressed perspective difficult to recognize. However, 
even a thoroughly privileged Western feminist can discern two forms of 
oppositional secrecy.  First, oppressed people build covert networks to escape 
or mitigate oppression, as in the case of the Underground Railroad or illegal 
systems providing contraceptive information and services. Second, people 
belonging to an oppressed group may “pass” as having a more politically 
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central identity.  For instance, Blacks may pass as White, or gays and lesbians 
pass as straight; indeed, all sorts of passing is possible through marriage and 
name-changes. 
These two types of oppositional secrecy take special forms.  For instance, 
a casual form of secret arises when people covertly share information by using 
a language different from the politically dominant tongue.  Francophones in 
English Canada and Latino/as in the U.S. occasionally make use of this tool 
for secrecy, and we can consider it an ad hoc networking provision, an 
Underground Railroad in microcosm.  The goal is to secure safe passage, not of 
whole people or physical provisions, but of information alone, just as some 
birth control networks provide. 
Some oppositional secrets combine the two strategies of passing and 
networking.  Passing as a typical house or generic institution may be important 
for a women’s shelter, but this requires a network of support by volunteers, 
and strict privacy policies that keep the shelter beyond easy access by abusers; 
all this together makes it possible for residents to hide their identities.  (More 
completely covert networks may be necessary for highly endangered clients.)  
Likewise, same-sex couples in the United States seeking access to marriage 
may use networks to provide temporary addresses and pass as residents of 
states that provide access to legal marriage; and in Japan they may pass as 
parent and child to gain access to the property rights otherwise afforded to 
couples (Maree 2004). 
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 Another hybrid of passing and networking that disrupts oppression is 
secret sabotage, including feigned helplessness, an underground activity that 
depends on passing.  A slave who intentionally damages farm machinery to 
provide another slave time to recuperate from an illness wishes to pass as a 
dutiful slave but also to negotiate systematic reprieve for the other (Douglas 
1995).  Appearing dutiful is also necessary for the mother who intentionally 
asks nonsensical questions, or burns dinner and breaks dishes.  Her behavior 
provides reprieve from the indignity that can infect motherwork, a reprieve 
provided by demonstrating to herself her own measure of independence 
(Lugones 2003, 5-6). 
The effects of secrecy vary according to context and are difficult to 
predict.  What is meant to be oppositional may instead be collaborative, and 
generally involves both.   Any oppositional activity is likely to be “curdled”, that 
is both blended with repressive aspects, and ambiguous in the face of 
interlocking oppressions (Lugones 1994; 2003, 8-16).  On the oppositional side, 
consider how passing tends be more useful for lesbians than gay men who may 
confront heterosexism without the complications of sexism (Card 1995). Yet, for 
lesbians, passing entails a special risk of collaboration: the invisibility of 
lesbian identity encourages neglect of lesbian issues and dismissal of specific 
lesbian concerns as merely personal or at best marginal and insignificant.  
Thus, lesbian invisibility can perpetuate lesbians’ minority status; indeed, any 
case of passing can perpetuate servility to the dominant culture, and so 
undermine personal dignity (Card 1995, 120).  So, the strategy of passing is 
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easily corrupted.  Note how passing as White is fraught for African-Americans 
seeking the benefits of skin privilege, who may therefore perceive themselves 
and be perceived by others as traitors.   
Unintentional collaboration in oppressive systems is less a danger for 
deliberate underground avenues of resistance.  Admittedly, a casual linguistic 
secret or underground network depends on those in power being substantially 
ignorant, and ignorance of marginalized lives can be a source of oppression. ii 
The occupation of separate physical and linguistic domains may support 
oppressive social systems.  Yet, employing the marginalized environment as an 
avenue for resistance need not validate the system of privilege in the same way 
or to nearly the same degree as acquiring the privileges of the political center 
by passing.  The ignorance that makes possible underground networks does 
not directly create the oppressive environment.  In no immediate sense does a 
slave-owner’s ignorance of survival means in the wild oppress the slaves, or a 
Canadian anglophone’s ignorance of the French language oppress 
francophones.iii  
However, collaboration may result indirectly from even the most pointed 
of oppositional actions, and thus to hidden emancipatory networks.   The 
success of the Underground Railroad was double-edged, as warned abolitionist 
and escaped slave, Frederick Douglas.  Of course, some slaves gained hope and 
abolitionists gained inspiration from hearing of it.  However, even the very 
limited awareness of it available to slave-holders, an awareness that might be 
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dismissed as rumour, could make the slave-holders extra vigilant, and may 
ultimately have served their interests more than the slaves (Douglas 1995, 60). 
Despite such frequently ambiguous implications of political secrecy, it 
certainly can be very effective, and it is not a strategy unique to the oppressed.  
Covert networks and disguises also undermine legitimate forms of social 
control.  Still, underground systems of prisoners whose social suppression is 
politically warranted can be left out of this discussion, at least insofar as we 
can distinguish between oppression and politically warranted suppression.  
Inmates in a prison may find means of sharing drugs and weapons, and for 
continued illegal and immoral behavior, means that resemble those of Jews in 
a concentration camp for sharing food and water; yet revealing unjust networks 
poses no problem for standpoint theory.  The relevant difference is not the 
materials exchanged and particular activities of networks, which only illustrate 
the contrast with networks mobilized against oppression. What morally 
distinguishes the cases  – or aspects of the cases, as they are curdled – is the 
purpose for the form of underground network, whether the goal is politically 
justified.  People imprisoned as a result of racist or classist social policies that 
may, for instance, lead them to steal in order to eat, have oppositional 
knowledge.  Their perspective provides cognitive advantage, productive 
alternative perspectives. 
As for networks, so for passing. Consider the moral dilemmas of Blacks 
passing as White in the Harlem renaissance that provide the backdrop for Nella 
Larsen’s novel, “Passing” (1997), Gertrude’s passing as White motivated by love 
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is sympathetic, and so it is interesting for standpoint theory.  By contrast, 
standpoint theorists can find little of cognitive significance in Gertrude’s friend, 
Clare, passing as White insofar as it is motivated by luxury.  Straightforward 
social climbing is not politically justified and reflects only a mainstream 
perspective.  Apparent similarities between oppositional secrets and other 
forms of secrecy need not confound people who use standpoint epistemology. 
 
Political Value 
Given the two distinguishable forms of oppositional secrecy, the question 
remains what political reasons generally keep people who oppose oppression 
from revealing or investigating the secrets of the oppressed despite the 
potential understanding to be gained. How does a person guided by standpoint 
theory decide when an oppositional secret may be revealed? How does an 
intellectual activist against oppression, who may or may not share a particular 
experience of oppression, know when to resist revealing or investigating 
politically justified secrecy? 
Whether one shares the particular experience of oppression, or shares 
the secret itself, the most obvious reasons for respecting the secrets of the 
oppressed rely on moral and political considerations.  The political project of 
emancipation depends on keeping the secret, at least to some extent or in some 
way, and so an inquirer must be aware that violating the secrecy jeopardizes 
those who participate in it.  The cost may be even their lives.  Clearly, no 
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foreseeable substantial moral or political threat to the participants in a secret 
can result from a permissible revelation.   
How is the threat to the oppositional project recognized and evaluated?  
People tend to resolve such dilemmas by seeking out those who share in the 
form of oppression, and those who are already trusted in sharing the secret. In 
the wrong hands secrets are dangerous, can be misused, and indeed can 
reinforce the circumstances of oppression, however noble one’s intentions.  The 
type of ignorance encouraged by social privilege may make a knower unaware 
of the dangerous implications of a particular piece of knowledge for the welfare 
of marginalized people.  Consider how White or straight folks may be oblivious 
as they “out” and thus endanger a person who is passing.  To ward off the 
potential danger, we appeal to the immorality of disrespecting the secrets of 
others.  The decision of when and how to reveal a secret is left as much as 
possible to the judgment of those whose secret it is.iv  The more removed one is 
from the content being hidden − whether or not the circumstance involves 
oppression, but with special care if it does − the less political authority one has 
to evaluate that circumstance and to investigate or share the secret.v  So, one 
avoids revealing or inquiring into the sexual or racial identity of others.  The 
person or people in question judge best the full practical and political import of 
open identification. 
Of course, deference to people who are party more than oneself to the 
secret only practically postpones the issue of secret revelation, leaving open at 
least two problems.vi  First, in most cases, it is not clear who is an insider to 
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the secret and who an outsider.  For instance, one may know that a secret 
exists on some topic or among some people, but not know other details.  
Moreover, being aware of the incompleteness of one’s understanding tends to 
motivate inquiry.  Most people faced with decisions about revealing or 
investigating secrets are both insiders and outsiders:  they are insiders insofar 
as they know at least that there is a secret, even if they have stumbled upon it 
accidentally; and they are outsiders insofar as they are interested themselves 
in a deeper understanding of it, or insofar as they are connected with people 
who don’t share but might be interested in it.  Second, deference to insiders 
does not resolve philosophically the issue of how insiders, and partial insiders 
who are the majority of concerned actors, decide for themselves and for others. 
A variety of ethical, pragmatic and social considerations come into play 
in deciding whether an oppositional secret may be revealed or investigated.  
However, whether their significance is greater than the potential for improving 
the community’s knowledge by sharing the secret is a further matter. 
 
From Political to Epistemological Evaluation 
Whether to reveal or investigate oppositional secrecy concerns knowledge 
writ large: not apolitical, timeless, placeless, disembodied knowledge, but the 
knowledge of marginalized communities as they exist in combination with other 
communities, that are smaller or larger, and politically central or differently 
marginalized.   People in these other communities are also cognitive 
beneficiaries of oppositional politics.  Admittedly, the ways in which knowledge 
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might serve the oppressed was the original issue for standpoint epistemology 
(Smith 1974; Harding 1986; 1991).  Standpoint theorists contest the ways in 
which science serves men at the expense of women, for instance by not testing 
medications on women, and then assuming women respond as men do. 
However, an emancipated science benefits not only the oppressed.  The 
community in general is supposed to gain understanding by thinking from the 
perspective of “others” and “other ‘others’” (Rose 1983; Harding 1991).  So, to 
be justified according to standpoint epistemology, revealing oppositional 
secrecy should improve the knowledge of all, or perhaps in utilitarian terms, 
provide the greatest understanding for the greatest number. 
Can cognitive advantage to the general community be sufficient to 
outweigh the political disadvantage of marginalized people losing a strategic 
secret? Does it make sense to think this way? Weighing cognitive against 
political values seems like comparing apples with oranges.  On the other hand, 
speaking as if cognition can be wholly separated from and contrasted with 
political or ethical values not only sounds crass it can only be a heuristic for 
identifying conflicting interests.  Such dichotomies are denied by feminist 
philosophers of science (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995), and 
particularly by standpoint theorists (Hartsock 1983; Rose 1983), who maintain 
that the cognitive value to accrue from obtaining an oppositional standpoint is 
always politically dependent. If the secrets are used to resist oppression, the 
political interests clearly take priority, but it is not clear just how much priority 
relative to the epistemological interests.  Yet, an account of the intersection 
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between political and epistemological interests can aid responsible inquiry, 
both personal and scientific. Distinguishing epistemological concerns may be 
artificial, but still informative, if only because people tend to divide up human 
interests by separating cognitive from ethical and political values. 
The epistemological value of a standpoint depends on there being a 
political center and contrasting social margins. Without the existence of 
oppression, no perspective provides a special epistemological advantage.  A 
certain cognitive value derives from a particular form of oppression up until the 
point at which we eradicate it.  With the achievement of social justice comes 
the elimination of what made that perspective demand special political and 
cognitive attention.  Without oppression, understanding from a particular 
social perspective is no longer underdeveloped or suppressed, and so it brings 
no special cognitive advantage (Figure 1). 
Figure 1:  Promoting Underdeveloped or 
Suppressed Understanding
Decreasing oppression over time
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Epistemological Value 
I suggest that just as for both suppressed and underdeveloped 
knowledge, political conditions can be portrayed in epistemological terms in the 
case of oppositional secrecy.  There are both cognitive and political reasons for 
respecting the authority of those experiencing oppression. This means that 
decisions about investigating or revealing secrets can be covered in the terms of 
a standpoint epistemology, and are not simply a matter of the political values 
outweighing the epistemological.  What appears to be an ethical trumping of 
cognitive interests is simply a nonstarter in cognitive terms that cannot 
motivate the revelation of politically necessitated secrets.  Little potential for 
gaining understanding about the world can arise from perspectives that are 
extremely vulnerable because of political circumstances. 
Admittedly, secrecy restricts access to certain information and cognitive 
skills, detracting from the flow of information that makes multiple perspectives 
available, and that benefits a community in general. For those who don’t share 
the secret, especially perhaps whom are pointedly deceived — the slaveholders, 
batterers and homophobes, the withheld wisdom could be very valuable.   
Recall, however, that liberatory political commitments are vital to the 
development of epistemic advantage from a standpoint.  It belongs less, for 
instance, to women or Blacks than to feminists or Africanists.  The 
circumstances of oppression must be problematized to reveal and develop the 
significance of that perspective for the future and the larger world; experience 
and testimony are only starting places for reasoning. Novel theories about the 
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workings of the world that may serve to inform the larger community emerge 
from experiences at the social margins after being refined by scrutiny and 
discussion among peers (Collins 2001; Wylie 1992).   
What counts as activism appropriate for opposing oppression depends on 
the judgments and perceived needs of those experiencing that form of 
oppression, such as slaves, abused women, and lesbians.  Their political goals 
set limits on the cognitive value that might derive from their perspective.  Black 
activism, for instance, can appear to non-Blacks as mere socializing (Collins 
2001). Outsiders’ respect for the self-determination of the people they would 
emancipate and the degree to which they recognize the insiders’ purposes 
restricts the knowledge outsiders might gain. 
Only if revealing a secret is expedient in the eyes of those who hold it, is 
it justified morally, and so justified epistemologically.  Just as the 
epistemological value of a standpoint declines when oppression recedes, it 
must also decline when a social situation is so politically precarious that 
knowledge must be hidden, and the fragility of any situation tends to be best 
judged by those close to it.     
Consider how to recognize on cognitive grounds the importance of 
maintaining the anonymity of women one knows or studies who reside in a 
shelter.  Those details might provide salience to a theory or a belief, or answer 
a problem.  However, the purpose of such a revelation can be only immediately 
practical; it won’t provide the long-term functionality sufficient to consider it 
cognitively valuable.   
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For instance, the value of a women’s shelter’s anonymity derives from 
mitigating the conditions of domestic violence.  Only in regard to that barrier or 
resistance is the knowledge of the details about the shelter significant in longer 
cognitive terms rather than merely immediate practical terms.  Should the 
practical political barrier against domestic violence become ineffective, the 
information concealed — the details of who resides, and so on — becomes less 
significant of the world.  It only serves the fleeting understandings of a few 
individuals.  An abuser, for instance, might find his or her goals — say of 
continued abuse or harassment — served by that information.  Yet, that one 
person or few people matter little in the consequentialist epistemologies of 
contemporary pragmatist-empiricism and naturalism that support standpoint 
theories (Sullivan 2001).  Better accuracy or empirical adequacy of knowledge, 
or more effective transactions, are developed through engagement with feminist 
and other liberatory perspectives.  
Likewise, the cognitive value of information surrounding the 
Underground Railroad would be less in a world or environment where such 
resistance floundered.  Only in a world where Africans continue to fight for or 
actually progress toward emancipation is there special cognitive value in 
learning about the Underground Railroad. 
The benefit for an outsider’s understanding of the world diminishes with 
the preciousness of the secret.  Such understandings are not merely 
suppressed or underdeveloped, but valuable because of and therefore 
contingent on the possibility of social change.  If an understanding is extremely 
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vulnerable in the current political climate, there is only a small chance that it 
will bear out.  The project served by the secret is likely to fail.  For instance, 
sharing knowledge of the existence of a secret may encourage others to seek 
out further details, and endanger the plans and corresponding projection of the 
world, as Frederick Douglas worried.  Whatever aspect of a secret is revealed, 
revelation of the information tends to change the political nature of the world 
and can undermine the secret’s cognitive potential if that potential is fragile.  
Fresh scrutiny will face the sabotaging wife should others become aware that 
there is some secret regarding her behavior. Their watchful eyes will make it 
difficult for her to continue to act out, and so will amplify the oppression she 
experiences. 
The extreme case of genocide demonstrates vividly how political necessity 
mitigates epistemological values.  There approaches nothing to learn of the 
future world from the understandings of peoples who do not survive.  Although 
there is much to learn from them about their oppression, that oppression stops 
being part of the world as those oppressed people stop being part of the world.  
The world becomes less the world those people lived in and understood, and 
their perspectives decline in relevance and epistemological value.vii 
 19 
Figure 2: Sharing Oppositional Secrets
Decreasing oppression over time
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In the moderate case of a shelter, clients’ identities also have less and 
less bearing on the world to the extent that the world shifts away from being a 
world where women are safe and those individuals survive and thrive.  Given 
that clients need shelter from abuse, a funding agency, for instance, has little 
to learn from their identities. Identifying individuals does not enhance the 
shelter’s hedge against their oppression and negotiations with the world in that 
service.  The limited success of individual cases provides examples to learn 
from, but only in regard to that degree of success does information about 
individuals’ identities become relevant.  Epistemological significance depends 
on there being an element of political success or promise, a factor that 
diminishes in extreme cases of oppression. (Figure 2) 
When people masquerade as victims to gain access to a shelter’s 
resources, the issue of understanding who receives the benefits becomes more 
practical and political, and is less a matter for standpoint theory as an 
epistemology.viii  Oppression isn’t resisted by secreting an abuser.  So, revealing 
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an abuser who masquerades as abused may teach a great deal about the 
current reality and many likely futures.  The potential reality served by an 
abuser’s masquerade is the status quo.   
Mainstream views are always somewhat cognitively relevant, though not 
specially advantageous, as I argued above.  Yet, there is less to gain cognitively 
from someone who cries abuse to escape devastating poverty than from 
someone whose masquerade serves ignoble ends. The unjust secret can teach 
about the world as it is, whereas the oppositional secret can teach more about 
the world as it might be.   
Whatever motivation there is for secret understandings, their cognitive 
value largely depends on how the world is shaped by politics now and in the 
possible future.  The more access abusers have to their victims, the less 
difference the victims’ meager secrets can make, even to the victims 
themselves, and the less real is the content of those secrets, in both a literal 
and a psychological sense. It is less possible for gays and lesbians to pass, and 
so less informative that they do, so long as they are persecuted.  The more 
thoroughgoing and accepted is slavery, the less the Underground Railroad can 
work to develop and preserve Africans’ culture, self-esteem, and individual 
lives.  The knowledge kept secret by people who suffer these forms of 
oppression is useful and true only to the extent that the world might support 
the value and the legitimacy of those people’s lives, a possibility that is 
threatened and undermined by oppression.  Secrets of the oppressed are 
meaningful views of the world and have cognitively important consequences 
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especially to the extent that those secrets support an otherwise endangered 
moral status and provide for political emancipation, which is to say, to the 
extent that they have morally desirable consequences.  Likewise, to the extent 
that oppositional politics require secrecy on moral grounds, the cognitive 
returns of revealing those secrets diminish: little is told of the present world. 
  
Conclusion 
Oppositional secrecy does not deliver the epistemological dilemma for 
standpoint theories that it seems to on first glance.  Rather, if the present 
political environment makes secrecy valuable, then there is a substantial 
threat to the political future protected, but to some extent only projected or 
viewed as a future possibility, by the secret.  Understanding threats to 
marginalized views of the world is implicit to the political considerations that 
usually guide decisions about respecting the authority of secret-holders.  
Oppositional secrets must be made or kept relevant to the world by initial steps 
progressing against oppression and toward making an egalitarian future real, 
in order that the secrets become more than idle hopes and dreams. In such 
cases, political concerns do not override epistemological concerns, but political 
circumstances make the epistemological value highly vulnerable. 
That epistemology can capture the reasons for preserving oppositional 
secrets does not imply that cognitive terms should be used for making 
decisions.  To the contrary, because the usual political terms with which we 
confront oppositional secrets track also cognitive aspects of the issue, we may 
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rest assured that we are not neglecting a full range of human values.  Political 
vulnerabilities that recommend keeping or respecting a secret indicate that the 
knowledge to be gained is tenuous.  So, the political concerns that motivate 
oppositional secrecy target epistemological implications.  Political values have 
cognitive aspects, just as feminist philosophers of science show that cognitive 
values have political aspects (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995). 
The cognitive basis for preserving politically necessitated secrecy reveals 
several things about standpoint theory.  Most generally, it helps to articulate 
exactly what is required for the sort of activism that can produce the epistemic 
advantage of a standpoint.  Activism is a crucial element, according to the 
theory that epistemic advantage derives from experiences of oppression, yet the 
notion of activism at work in standpoint theories is opaque.  The form of 
activism that yields cognitive advantage in the case of oppositional secrecy 
reveals the dependence of cognitive advantage on projected possible futures, 
and the strength of these futures’ possibility. (How this strength is to be 
assessed is an open question, but how the futures projected by current 
mainstream interests in the West will fail is probably because they are 
unsustainable in the long run, especially unsustainable by the material 
environment.)  Whereas suppressed knowledge and underdeveloped knowledge 
can provide epistemological advantage only so long as oppression remains, 
oppositional secrecy reveals that some prospect of success against oppression 
is also necessary. 
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i Collins uses the terminology of “outsiders within.”  However, in other 
discussions of standpoint theory, what is inside and what is outside can be 
reversed, as it is in this discussion of secrets.  To acknowledge this 
ambivalence, I adopt Alison Wylie’s terminology (2003).   
ii This demonstrates Charles Mills’ (1997) understanding of ignorance as a 
concrete phenomenon, something more than a lack of knowledge.  Indeed, 
ignorance may function as a tool, and although created to serve oppression it 
may be periodically turned against it (pace Audre Lorde). 
iii  Admittedly, food banks are networks that foster middle-class ignorance 
about hunger as a social problem, and that ignorance deters social change.  
Achieving real independence can be frustrated by passing as independent, so 
food banks both oppose and reinforce oppression.  Further discussion of the 
ambiguity of activism is below. However, the collaboration results from those 
networks being institutions of the dominant culture, rather than being native 
to the poor.  Being more thoroughly engaged with the needs of marginalized 
people, native networks are less vulnerable to collaboration in oppression. 
iv  Detailed discussion of the general moral dynamics of secrecy, including the 
priority of individuals in choosing whether or not to keep secrets, can be found 
in Sissela Bok (1983). 
v Political assessment of authority contrasts with traditional scientific 
assessment of authority based on distance from the subject of study. 
vi In cases where the oppressed are not aware of a secret directed toward their 
emancipation, they are not party to it, strictly speaking.  The subjects of the 
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secret are only the activists who are privy to it, up until such a point as others 
come to share in the secret.  People must have access to the secret or else not 
really be part of it. 
vii  It might be argued that in the case of genocide, we lose forever a cognitive 
perspective, and the loss of that resource is epistemologically destructive.  
However, not just any view can count as good view, and even the value of 
diverse views need not suffer profoundly from the loss of one, because that loss 
need not entail a loss in human diversity.  Continued diversification of human 
practices and epistemic resources is possible because of human plasticity. 
viii This might be addressed by a politics of standpoints or a form of social 
epistemology that goes beyond standpoint theory. 
